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THE AMERICAN LAW SCHOOL & THE RISE OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
GOVERNMENT. By William C. Chase. Madison and London: Uni-
versity of Wisconsin Press. 1982. Pp. x, 182. $18.50. 
William Chase1 has joined the ranks of those who bewail Chris-
topher Langdell's introduction of the case method into legal educa-
tion. His thesis is that the case method discouraged the use of a 
judicial model for administrative decisionmaking by leaving little 
room for the study of administrative law (p. ix).2 This omission but-
14. q: I. BALBUS, MARXISM AND DOMINATION 56 (1982) (emphasis in original): 
If we did not assume that there were compelling reasons for the proletariat to define its 
interest as the interest in transcending capitalist alienation,. then there would be no war-
rant for characterizing its failure to so define its interests as false, and we should rather 
perhaps conclude that Marx's theory is false. The entire problematic of false conscious-
ness is based on a search for the causes of an absence. That this absence should be a 
problem worth pursuing, however, rather than a nonproblem, assumes that it is an ab-
sence of a presence that is reasonable to expect. But this is precisely what Marx has been 
unable to demonstrate. This suggests, once again, that it is Marx's theory, rather than 
working-class consciousness, that must be called into question. 
1. J.D., Ph.D., Harvard University. 
2. Administrative decisions constitute "internal" law, which concerns the formulation of 
specific policies. Internal law is an" 'unfixed obligation,'" p. 61 (quoting B. WYMAN, THE 
PRINCIPLES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 13 (1903)), that varies according to the dictates of 
expediency. It thus lacks those "attributes which make it 'law' in the sense that it is fit to be 
treated by judges and legal scholars, or to be taught in law schools." P. 61. 
Chase suggests that because the case method only permits inquiry into actual cases, the 
study of administrative law in law school is limited to examination of appellate court cases 
reviewing agency decisions. These cases are often restricted to questions revolving around 
whether the agency has properly exercised its congressionally granted jurisdiction - an issue 
of external law. P. 62. See generally B. WYMAN, supra. According to Chase, courts have 
avoided reviewing the substance of decisions because in doing so they would 
come to be increasingly concerned with, and perhaps dominated by, issues of industrial 
and social regulation arising out of administrative controversies; and the law school 
would experience something like a revolution in its curriculum and its scholarship. There-
fore, the only acceptable conclusion . . . had to be that the substance of administrative 
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tressed the traditional view that courts are passively to assist private 
parties in ordering their affairs and thus delayed the emergence of 
our "modem" sense of the judicial function, which views the judge 
as an "aggressive public 'policy planner and manager' " (pp. 3-4). 
According to Chase, this blow to legal development weakened "the 
exercise of both administration and the judicial function in modem 
America" (p. ix). 
Chase argues that although Langdell hoped to impart to students 
a scientific knowledge of the law by using the case method to explore 
legal decisions systematically (pp. 28-29), no such comprehensive 
"science oflaw'' ever materialized (p. 30). The case method survived 
anyway, he suggests, because by the time its failure became apparent 
a class oflaw professors with a personal stake in its perpetuation had 
emerged (p. 34). According to Chase, professors wanted to preserve 
the value of their years of work in collecting and compiling cases (p. 
34). They also had a psychological investment in the case method. 
Law professors reaffirmed their own academic worth each time they 
rewarded students who excelled under the very system that had re-
warded them. The companion of the case method, the Socratic 
method, also enhanced the professors' emotional satisfaction (p. 35). 
Of course, Harvard required a more sophisticated justification for 
retaining the case method and so, according to Chase, it put forth the 
argument that if law students could not learn all the law under the 
case method, at least they would learn to think like lawyers (p. 36). 
Contrary to Chase's thesis, one might view the widespread ac-
ceptance of the case method as an indication that it at least appeared 
to have some merit. Chase, however, rejects this argument. Instead, 
he suggests that Harvard bullied other law schools into accepting its 
approach by exporting "legal missionaries for the case method" to 
other law schools that wanted to expand their programs and increase 
their prestige (p. 43).3 It also cornered the casebook market, so 
schools "wishing to sample the case method . . . had to swallow 
Harvard whole" (p. 44). Finally, Chase contends that Harvard sup-
pressed potential competition from an alternative teaching method 
styled on the continental approach to legal education (pp. 46-59). 
This method, according to Chase, would have focused on a compre-
hensive survey of the legal order (pp. 46-47) and would have empha-
sized administrative rather than case law. In support of this 
proposition, Chase relates that wh~n Joseph Beale, a Harvard pro-
fessor, became dean of Chicago's embryonic law school he all but 
adjudication was not reviewable, that the administrator's decision was final within the 
scope of his authority. 
Pp. 67-68. 
3. See R. STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL 36 (1983) (reviewed in this issue) (discussing the tremen-
dous influence that Harvard and other elite legal institutions have had in shaping legal educa-
tion); Feinman & Feldman, Book Review, 82 MICH. L. REV. 914 (1984). 
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dismissed Professor Ernst Freund, who had attempted to establish 
such a competing method of legal instruction there (pp. 53-59). 
Unfortunately, Chase's reasoning is not completely persuasive. 
He does not clearly outline the propositions upon which his thesis 
rests. Further, once the reader discerns the necessary propositions, 
she must still locate the support for them in Chase's disjointed pres-
entation. For example, one point that Chase tries to establish is that 
psychological factors motivated law professors to preserve the case 
method. Yet Chase's argument that the method endured because of 
the egotism of a few Harvard professors is unconvincing. Certainly 
educators at other schools were not, at that point, clearly interested 
in pursuing the case method. Something besides perversity must 
have persuaded those professors that Harvard's approach had value. 
Chase's suggestion that Harvard simply misled many eminent schol-
ars seems implausible, especially because those scholars had a 
number of other reasons to adopt the case method, the most impor-
tant of which is that it is arguably an effective mode of legal 
instruction.4 
Similarly, Chase does not convincingly establish the superiority 
of the "modem" sense of the judicial function. As a re~ult, it is un-
clear why anyone should fret if administrative law's failure to adopt 
a judicial model delayed the emergence of a more aggressive judicial 
role. Chase's argument on this point amounts to little more than a 
bald assertion that courts are good instruments for implementing 
public policy because they seem to be "articulate, purposeful, and 
relatively immune to petty political influence" (p. 3). He fails to ad-
dress counterarguments,5 such as those which suggest that judges 
may not remain immune to political influence once they become a 
more visible part of the political process or those which argue that 
judges are not qualified to perform the sort of fact :finding necessary 
to effect public policy decisions. Chase's thesis is further weakened 
by his failure to respond to the contention that even if judges could 
determine public policy, the consciously negotiated character of their 
policy decisions might destroy the public sense that courts impar-
tially apply law. 
Although Chase does not argue well for his thesis, his book does 
offer some insight into the historical treatment of administrative law 
in the law school curriculum, the scholarly debates about the proper 
role of the judicial function in administrative law, and the tech-
niques that advocates on different sides of that issue have used to 
4. See Chase, Book Review, 67 MINN. L. REv. 844, 850-51 (1983). Another possible expla-
nation is that the case method has the financial advantage of allowing for large classes and a 
high faculty-student ratio. See R. STEVENS, supra note 3, at 63. 
5. The counterarguments are presented in Chayes, 17,e Role of the Judge in Public Law 
Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1281, 1309 (1976). 
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advance their views. One must wonder, however, whether Chase's 
zeal has led him to ignore material and arguments that do not sup-
port his thesis. 6 At best, this book is only likely to provoke some 
thought about the plight of administrative law; it is hardly likely to 
persuade a critical reader that its conclusions have merit.7 
6. Chase has been criticized for his failure to mention important works such as the writings 
of Eliot and Langdell and Harvard's Annual Reports, see, e.g., ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE 
PRESIDENT AND TREASURER OF HARVARD COLLEGE 1894-95 (1895), which provide a com-
mentary on the early history of the case method. Chase, supra note 4, at 847-48. 
7. Chase, to some extent, recognizes this himself: "I realize that when an author forsakes a 
comprehensive narrative of his subject he also forsakes the means to persuade his readers that 
his conclusions are ironclad." P. x. 
